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JUVENILE COURT LAW OF 1950
PAUL D. BROWN*
A comprehensive new Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
law became effective in Virginia on July i, 195o. This commentary
is primarily concerned with the provisions relating to juveniles; its
purpose is merely to introduce some background against which the
legislation should be considered, and to point out some of the prin-
cipal changes the new statute effects in the previous situation.
BACKGROUND
Since the establishment in 1899 in Chicago of the first separate
court concerned with juveniles, it has become generally recognized
in this country that juvenile courts are not based on the adversary
theory with its concomitants of vengeance and punishment taken
from the criminal law. The juvenile court rests its sanctions on the
inherent right of the sovereign to protect his subjects. The theory is
one of governmental support of the family as a unit as distinguished
from a governmental "taking-over" of parental functions. If categor-
izing is required, the juvenile court is a court of chancery following
the principles of equity.
The first Virginia juvenile court legislation was passed in 1914.1
Under this first and remarkably complete statute, courts of record
and police and justice courts could hear cases concerning juveniles
and adjudge them delinquent, neglected or dependent, if the facts
met given definitions. Probation or commitment to the State board
of charities and corrections might be ordered by the particular court
hearing the case. Juvenile offenders were "deemed not to be criminals"
or treated as such, and only aggravated offenses could involve trial
as an adult. Councils of cities of over 5o,ooo population were author-
ized to appoint a justice of a separate juvenile and domestic relations
court. In 1922, the General Assembly provided that there should be
established in every city and county a juvenile and domestic relations
court.
2
Though the philosophy and purposes of these laws were accepted,
*Member of the Arlington, Va., Bar.
'Va. Acts of Assembly (1914) c. 57 and 350.
Wa. Acts of Assembly (1922) c. 481- 3 .
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they failed to accomplish their purpose, except in a few urban locali-
ties which took advantage of the provision for a separate court. In
most of the remaining localities the child appeared in the open adult
court and experienced the atmosphere of a criminal proceeding.
'While not sentenced to jail except for aggravated offenses, the only
probationary supervision was from the well-meaning, but untrained,
county sheriff or city chief of police. In 1936, the trial justices in
counties, and the police court justices in cities not having special
juvenile and domestic relations courts, were given primary jurisdic-
tion of these cases.3
In 1945 the picture in Virginia was: io,868 children before 83
courts, which were served by 26 full-time probation officers, 18 of
whom were employed in 16 cities, leaving but 8 serving full time in
all of the remainder of the twenty-four cities and one hundred coun-
ties of the state; and 8oo children (then classified as delinquents) being
committed annually to the State Board of Public Welfare.4 The void
as to probation officers was met principally by reliance upon local
departments of welfare. A survey of the 1945 situation showed that
almost no two courts functioned alike. There were twenty types of
replies to the question concerning when warrants were used. Seven-
teen types of procedure were indicated as to the use of petitions.
Seventy-seven per cent of the courts were, commendably enough, using
informal hearings without either warrant or petition, but the authority
for such hearings were doubtful, to say the least. In 1946 almost 4,000
children of the state were in jail.5 Less than half the judges received
salaries for juvenile court service; those who were paid received com-
pensation ranging from $18o.oo per year to $7,9oo.oo.6
In the 1948 session of the General Assembly, Senate Bill 175 was
introduced. Briefly, it proposed seventeen juvenile and domestic rela-
tions courts of record and would have created separate courts with
specially qualified judges and the necessary probation officers. Its
supporters cited Virginia's high and expensive crime rate, the alarm-
ing juvenile problem and the ultimate economy of an effective juvenile
Va. Acts of Assembly (1936) c. S85.
4Baughman, Full-Time Problems and Part-Time Court, i Bulletin of the Vir-
ginia Conference of Social Work, p. 5, April, 1946.
IV. A. L. C. Reports on Senate Bill 175 (1948) p. ii gives a figure of 2,650 for
1948.
6Figures used in this paragraph are taken from two articles in i Bulletin of
the Virginia Conference of Social Work, April, 1946: Phillips, The Path to the
Court, p. 9, and Baughman, Full-Time Problems and Part-Time Court, p. 5.
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court system. This bill was referred to the Virginia Advisory Legisla-
tive Council for study and report to the 1950 session of the Assembly.
7
THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT
On November 80, 1949 the Council reported on Senate Bill 175
(1948) and presented an alternate bill maintaining the earlier aims.
The report labeled seventeen courts as "impractical," and did "not
recommend that juvenile and domestic courts should at this time be
made courts of record...." In its report, the V.A.L.C. stated it
"recognizes a need for, endorses and recommends the establishment
of a State-wide system of juvenile probation and also a State-wide
system of juvenile detention as provided for in Senate Bill 175." S It
did not, however, feel that it was necessary to establish an independent
commission to provide the necessary overall supervision and adminis-
tration to the courts and their related services. It was felt this could
be adequately handled as a subdivision of the existing Department
of Welfare and Institutions.
The V. A. L. C. offered its bill as an endeavor: (i) to correct the
"inadequacy, or often the complete absence, of the probation, deten-
tion and psychiatric services which are indispensable to the proper
administration of a juvenile court"; (2) to correct the striking weak-
ness in jurisdiction under which a child could be indicted and tried
without, at least, initial hearing in the juvenile and domestic rela-
tions court; 9 (3) to eliminate the statutory inconsistencies resulting
from a quarter of a century of piece-meal amending; and (4) to make
the law more uniform, more standardized and more comprehensive. 10
MAJOR CHANGES PROPOSED AND ADOPTED
The law as proposed by the V. A. L. C. was changed in some details
and adopted by the General Assembly as Chapter 383 of its 195o Acts.
It is found in the Code as Section 16-172.1 through Section 16-172.84.
The statute now includes probably 95% of the provisions of the
Standard Juvenile Court Act of the National Probation Association.
Variations occur as to provisions of the Standard Act which never
have been unanimously accepted.
'The background of the law as of February, 195o is detailed in Note (1950)
36 Va. L. Rev. 113.
8V. A. L. C. Report on Senate Bill 175 (1948) p. ii.
'See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 6 S. E. (2d) 641 (1941) cert.
denied, 314 U. S. 69o, 62 S. Ct. 362, 86 L. ed. 552 (1941).
"V. A. L. C. Report on Senate Bill 175 (1948) pp. 5-7.
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The following major provisions of the new law should be noted:"
i. The requirement of a court for every county and city is re-
tained, but with the right in cities and counties to join in establish-
ing a district court.
12
2. The law is remedial. The welfare of the child is the para-
mount concern of the state, and to attain this purpose judges are
granted "all necessary and incidental powers and authority, whether
legal or equitable in their nature."'1 Quaere: Does this grant of equity
powers to a court not of record give the power to issue injunctions,
other than as incident to the power to suspend sentences? For exam-
ple: to enjoin acts which contribute to the delinquency of a child or
to enjoin removal of a child from the jurisdiction pending determina-
tion of a custody action.
3. City charter provisions conflicting with the new law are re-
pealed.14 There is now a uniformity in the mode of selection of judges.
In the counties and in cities of less than 25,ooo population the circuit
court appoints for a four-year term15 after the terms of judges in
office July 1, 195o have expired.16 In the remaining cities the corpora-
tion or hustings court appoints for a six-year term. If there are other
courts of record, the selection is by "election" by those judges, any tie
being broken by the Governor.
The statute provides that "...all judges elected or appointed
under this law shall enter upon the discharge of their duties the
first day of January next succeeding their election or appointment,
..... 17 Quaere: Is there not a hiatus if an incumbent's term expires
(i) in December, and by oversight no appointee is named until after
January ist or (2) if it expires by his death before the end of his term?
Section 16-172.9 only fills the gap as to a substitute judge's acting in
"The terminology of this comment follows the definitions of a child or juvenile
as a person under 18 and a minor as a person over 17 and under 21 years of age.
However, the statutory definition of a minor is over eighteen and under twenty
one .... [italics supplied]. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 16-172. 3 . This hiatus is
apparently carried over from similar language in the V. A. L. C. Report on Senate
Bill 175 (1948). However, the Report also referred to a minor as "between 18-21
years." See pages 8 and z5 of the Report. It appears that the term "over eighteen"
should be regarded as meaning "over the eighteenth birthday."
'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §§ 16-172.4 and 16-172.8. [Section references in







the event of the resignation, death, removal or permanent disability
of the judge or associate judge.
4. In all counties and in cities of less than 25,ooo population,
the trial justice "shall" be appointed if otherwise qualified.18 This pro-
vision rejects use of the word "may" by the V. A. L. C. which felt a
trial justice would then be too busy as judge of two courts and often
would have a private law practice on the side. The mandatory "shall"
may prove a hindrance in populous counties, though at least one
populous county has no trial justice as such.
5. Localities are required to provide a suitable courtroom, offices
and equipment. 19
6. The judge is empowered to appoint a clerk, a bailiff, proba-
tion officers and, with limitations, such other employees as may be
necessary.
2 0
7. The cooperation of public officials and certain institutions is
required and the court authorized to seek the cooperation and assist-
ance of public or private societies, agencies or institutions.21
8. Jurisdiction is exclusive and original and is set forth in detail
in Section 16-172.23.
Offenses involving two members of a "family" are heard by the
court. However, "in-laws" still are not included in the definition of:
"husband and wife, parent and child, brothers and sisters, grand-
parent and grandchild." They may be included, as would adopted
children, in the court's jurisdiction over "any violation of law the
effect or tendency of which is to cause or contribute in any way to
the disruption of marital relations or a home." Such broad definitions
will require close scrutiny of complaints, else trial justices and police
justices will be hearing cases which develop as disrupting a home
and which fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the juvenile
and domestic relations court. If the child's age appears while criminal
proceedings are pending then courts of record may, and other courts
must, transfer the matter forthwith to the juvenile court.
22
Sub-sections 7 and 823 can be mis-read as limiting the court func-
2BSec. 16-1724.
"Sec. 16-172.19.
OSecs. 16-172-11 and 16-172.71.
2Sec. 16-172.21
22Sec. 16-17241.
2'Sec. 16-172.23, Subsecs. 7 and 8:
Except as hereinafter limited they shall have within the corporate limits of a
city or the boundaries of a county in which they sit exclusive original jurisdiction,
and within one mile beyond the corporate limits of said city concurrent jurisdiction
3.9511
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tion to that of an examining magistrate as to felonies committed by
a child, as was held under the former law in Mickens v. Common-
wealth.24 They must be viewed in the full context of the statute for
Sub-section 1 (i) recites the court's jurisdiction over children as in-
cluding violations of any state law; children-those under 18-cannot
be "convicted" or designated "criminals" by reason of a juvenile court
finding;25 and clearest of all Section 16-172.42 gives the court an option
to retain jurisdiction or certify such child "for proper criminal pro-
ceedings" if the offense by an adult would be punishable by 20 years
or less in the penitentiary. Offenses which would involve greater pun-
ishment if committed by an adult may likewise be retained or certified,
subject to the right of the Commonwealth's Attorney to present the
case to the Grand Jury and remove it from the juvenile court by
obtaining an indictment.
Thus the court hears a case with two things in mind: should this
offense, a felony if committed by an adult, be certified to a court of
record for indictment and criminal trial, or should jurisdiction be
retained and the case studied, keeping in view the welfare of the child?
The question might be re-phrased to: Is the welfare of this child, who
is 14 or over, so beyond repair that he should be certified for treatment
as an adult criminal? In the words of the statute, is he beyond adequate
control or inducement to lead a correct life? Here is found the tenor
of the whole law. Hearings are not criminal in nature though such
offenses may be involved. The welfare of the child is the paramount
concern of the State. This approach is the justification for considering
the evidence under the "preponderance" and not under the "beyond
all reasonable doubt" standard.
with the juvenile court or courts of the adjoining county or counties over all cases,
matters and proceedings involving: ...
7. The prosecution and punishment of persons charged with ill-treatment,
abuse, abandonment or neglect of children or with any violation of this law which
causes or tends to cause a child to come within the purview of this law, or with
any other offense against a child except murder and manslaughter, provided, that,
in prosecution for other felonies over which the court shall have jurisdiction, such
jurisdiction shall be limited to that of examining magistrate.
8. All offenses except murder and manslaughter committed by one member of
the family against another member of the family; and the trial of all criminal
warrants in which one member of the family is complainant against another mem-
ber of the family, provided, that in prosecution for other felonies over which the
court shall have jurisdiction, said jurisdiction shall be limited to that of examining
magistrate. The word "family" as herein used shall be construed to include husband
and wife, parent and child, brothers and sisters, grandparent and grandchild; ....
24178 Va. 273, 16 S. E. (2d) 641 (1941).
2 Sec. 16-172.45.
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9. Venue is tied to the actual presence of the child within the
court's jurisdictional area "... unless the court for good cause shall
otherwise determine."
26
1o. A new section of particular interest to attorneys in the domes-
tic relations field is quoted in full in the footnotes.27 Other courts
are not deprived of concurrent jurisdiction as to the custody of chil-
dren when that question rises by way of a writ of habeas corpus or
where that question or the question of guardianship is ". . . incidental
to the determination of causes pending in such courts, .. ."-e. g., di-
vorce. Quaere: Can habeas corpus now be brought in the juvenile and
domestic relations court, whether the juvenile court has assumed cus-
tody of a child or not? To be kept in mind is a ruling of the Attorney
General that under the old law, (presumably this one, also), custody
of a ward of the court remained solely in the juvenile or domestic
relations court.
28
ii. The initiation of juvenile cases is revised in major ways.29
The court must require an investigation of facts and circumstances
surrounding a complaint of a violation of the law before proceeding
either informally or by petition. However, "any person" has the right
to file a petition. The use of probation officers for all such investiga-
tions is presently impossible, for today the average juvenile court in
"Sec. 16-172.25.
"Sec. 16-172.26:
Nothing contained in this law shall deprive any other court of the concurrent
jurisdiction to determine the custody of children upon a writ of habeas corpus
under the law or to determine the custody or guardianship of children when such
custody or guardianship is incidental to the determination of causes pending in
such courts, provided that when a court of record shall have taken jurisdiction
thereof the juvenile and domestic relations court shall be divested of such juris-
diction. Such courts may certify such matters to the juvenile and domestic relations
court for hearing and determination or for recommendation.
2See report of J. H. Montgomery, Jr., Associate Judge, Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, Richmond, Va., The Juvenile Court Act.
-Sec. 16-172.30:
Whenever any person informs the court that any child or minor is within the
purview of this law or subject to the jurisdiction of the court hereunder, except for
a minor traffic violation or violation of the fish and game law, the court shall require
an investigation which may include the physical, mental and social conditions and
personality of the child or minor and the facts and circumstances surrounding the
violation of the law. The court may then proceed informally and make such adjust-
ment as is practicable without a petition or may authorize a petition to be filed by
any person and if any such person does not file a petition a probation officer or a
police officer shall file it; but nothing herein shall affect the right of any person
to file a petition if he so desires. In case of violation of the traffic laws, or game
and fish laws the court may proceed on any summons issued without the filing of
a petition.
1951"[
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Virginia has no probation officer or is understaffed. It is submitted
that in many instances and until there are sufficient probation officers
this may be handled, at least initially, by enlightened non-uniformed
police investigation, through specially designated juvenile officers.
Then a better result is often obtained, for the child ultimately placed
under the guidance and counseling of a probation officer will not
carry over that natural resentment against the person who uncovered
the facts surrounding his violation. Counseling is more readily ac-
cepted.
The court now has stated authority to proceed informally and
"make such adjustment as is practicable without a petition." Fre-
quently complaints involve youthful transgressions which, at the time
the complaint is made, stand out as those which may be "closed with
a warning." A telephoned summons to the parents, a brief hearing
and a conclusion that parental disciplines and control are adequate
and that a warning is sufficient, are typical of informal hearings.
Should the child be exonerated, he may be told so by the court.
Should his problem be serious, then receipt of a petition may follow.
Generally the result is to head off the development of serious child
situations and to save time in the mechanics of handling a petition,
summons, and notice to parents living within the state but at times
outside of the court's jurisdictional area.
"Minor traffic" and game and fish law violations may be heard
on any summons issued, without the filing of a petition. 0
In adult cases latitude is granted paralleling juvenile informal
hearings. If used, this authority can be most effective in, for example,
cases against grown children for non-support of an aged and destitute
parent. Ordinarily proof of ability to provide such support, beyond the
needs of the adult son's family is hard to obtain. An informal adjust-
ment might often better meet the aim of the law on the basis of a
"voluntary" acceptance of the legal duty to support.3 '
12. Previously no warrant of arrest could be issued for any child
under 12 years of age without the written permission of a judge of a
court of record or a juvenile and domestic relations court justice. Now
written permission is not required. The lower age limit for warrants
has been raised to 14 "when use of such process is imperative." 82
13. Formerly under Code Section 1918 the court had authority





fifty dollars, and if a child over 13 could not be made to lead a correct
life under the juvenile law, then the child could be proceeded against
as if he were over 18 and in the process be committed to jail. In other
words, the case of a thoroughly unruly '17 year old could be trans-
ferred to a criminal court not necessarily of record.
Now, reparation as well as restitution may be required, and the
fine provision is retained. Unfortunately there is omitted any mention
of a probation fee, and this effective power is lost to the court. The
General Assembly has apparently retained the availability of possible
transfer of a child to a criminal court for trial, with a lower age limit
of 14 years and over. This is dearly so as to felonies under Section
16-172.42. The authority as to misdemeanors is found in Section 16-
172.43, but is confusingly located after a sentence referring to the
preceding section on felonies. The interpretation which ignores the
felony-misdemeanor distinction is in line with better juvenile court
theory, for the test is not what the child did but rather, in the words
of the statute, can he be: "adequately controlled or induced to lead a
correct life by use of the various disciplinary and corrective measures
available to the court.88
14. The appeal period has been reduced from 20 to 1o days with
the new right in the court to grant a rehearing within 30 days. Juvenile
court orders remain in effect during petition for or on the pendency of
an appeal or writ of error unless otherwise ordered by the appellate
court. The appellate court may enter its order or judgment and, as
to both juveniles and adults, remand the matter to the juvenile court.8 4
15. The court "may" reopen any case and revoke or modify its
order after written notice to the complainant and the person or agency
having custody of the child or minor. The section 5 is labeled "Review
of Order of Commitment." However, it is broad enough to cover
any case. An indication that the General Assembly wished to rely on
the court's discretion is found in the omission of the V. A. L. C.
phraseology "The Court of its own motion or on written complaint
of a parent, guardian or next friend of a child ... may reopen .... 36
There is no limitation as to children committed to the State Board
of Welfare and Institutions and subsequently placed by it in a foster
home, a Virginia or out-of-state industrial school. In effect, then, local




"IV. A. L. C. Report on Senate Bill 175 (1948) p. 23 [italics supplied].
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ment with the disposition made of a child committed to the State
Board.3
7
16. Of especial significance is the omission of the terms delin-
quent, neglected and dependent. A full column of the old code at-
tempted definitions, but it is difficult to say which label was most
appropriate. Many delinquincies grew out of dependency and neglect.
The new phraseology is "within the purview of the juvenile court
law." It comes from the Standard Juvenile Court Act. Juveniles re-
spond better and have no reason to become as angry and uncoopera-
tive as many were when told they were "delinquent." The word was
opprobrious, to say the least. "It is generally agreed that in dealing
with the child as an individual the attempt to classify and label him
is unnecessary and often impractical and harmful."
38
However, the three terms have been retained in Code Section
18-6 which includes the frequently used charge of "contributing to
the delinquency of a child." An appropriate legislative amendment
is in order.
17. To a degree, a state-wide juvenile probation system has been
established as recommended by the V. A. L. C. Officers are appointed
from a state list. In addition to their former court assigned duties,
the Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions (or sub-
ordinate administrative officer) may assign duties and may now require
records of the officer's work.39 Information obtained by the officers is
privileged now, subject, of course, to disclosure to the judge. Such in-
formation may not be disclosed to anyone else unless ordered by the
judge or the judge of a court of record.4 0 On the state level, the
Director is authorized to create a division in his department and to
appoint a head thereof to administer the system including the super-
vision of local juvenile detention homes. Apparently for lack of funds
no immediate appointment was made, though temporary assignment
of the responsibility was given to Mr. Paul Keve in addition to his
former duties with the Child Care Bureau. It has now been an-
nounced that Mr. Keve will, commencing July 1, 1951, have the
permanent assignment. The Director is empowered to transfer the
supervision of a probationer should the probationer move to another
locality or state.4 '
"'Note that Sec. 16-172.81 allows rehearing in any case for good cause shown
and after due notice to interested parties.





If local governing bodies do not provide for a probation officer
(by appropriation of one half of a salary determined by them),42 the
local superintendent of public welfare or one of his assistants "shall
serve." Otherwise, with limitations, they may serve.
43
18. Children and minors going back to their localities following
commitment to state custody may now be returned "to the commit-
ting court for supervision by juvenile probation officers" or, as before,
to the local superintendent of the department of public welfare. This
important rehabilitative period can be controlled better in some in-
stances by a man, yet, as the V.A. L. C. pointed out, "all but six
of the local welfare departments have only women on their staffs."
The problem has been of major proportions for about 2,000 children
are "parolees," and that number exceeds the number of adults on
parole.
44
When such children come back to the committing court and the
court feels after full investigation that the child should not be replaced
in his own home, then under certain conditions the state will pay for
boarding him in a foster home or institution. Thus a child need not
be returned to his home if the home was so bad as to cause his dere-
lictions in the first instance.45
CONCLUSIONS
The new law is a sweeping revision incorporating most features
of the Standard Juvenile Court Act. It places greater emphasis on
the welfare of the child and moves away still farther from the "crim-
inal" approach. The possibility of continued use of trial justices as
juvenile and domestic relations court judges and the local appoint-
ment of probation officers mean that the effectiveness of the law in
creating separate and adequate courts still remains with the counties
and cities of the state, for they may retain the status quo. While the
greatest need for development is in the counties and smaller cities,
both were left out of the appropriation act which gives certain cities
5o% reimbursement of the salaries of probation officers. If any reim-
bursement is to be made, it should apply to all counties and cities.
If district courts are to be created by two or more localities, it will
have to be done now while incumbent judges are remaining in office,
for most of them are judges of other courts and when new judges
"Sec. 16-172.72.
"Sec. 16-172 .73.
"V. A. L. C. Report on Senate Bill 175 (1948) p. 9.
"Secs. 16-172.77-8.
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are named in every area, each area will thereafter want to keep its
own court. The overloading of local department of public welfare
with probation work will not cease until a sufficient number of local
probation officers are appointed so that they may take the initial load
as well as be in a position to accept responsibility for "parolees."
The desires of social agencies and interested persons have been
heard in preparation of the law. It would appear that the bar and
particularly the judges of these courts should meet to discuss the
statute to seek out points in conflict or in need of clarification and
to recommend appropriate corrections in time for presentation to
the 1952 session of the General Assembly.
46
"6Since this comment was written a meeting of the Virginia Council of Juvenile
Court Judges was held in Richmond, January 22-23, 1951, at which this matter
was discussed and placed on the agenda of the spring meeting of the Council to
be held at the same time as the meeting of the Virginia Council of Social Work.
Opinions of the Attorney General, some eighteen in number, relative to the Juvenile
Court Law of 195o, were discussed. Their forthcoming publication in the opinions
of the Attorney General will be of interest to those who work frequently with this
law.
